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COVENANTS FOR TITLE.

Real and Personal Covenants.

A covenant is either real or personal.

It is real when

a man binds himself to pass a real thing, as lands or tenements ; or where it runs with the land, so that one who has
the land has the covenant or holds the land subject to the

covenant.

Thus all covenants real, are those 'which have

for their object something annexed to, or inherent in,
nected with the land, or other real property.'

or con-

A covenant is

personal when it attaches to the person and some person in
particular shall be benefitted by, or charged with it.
The essential difference between a real and personal covenant is, that a real covenant runs with the land, and extends to all who claim under the grantee, and it is also trans-

ferred to a purchaser.

Therefore, where a covenant real is

entered into by a grantee or lessee, it will not only bind
such grantee or lessee, but also his assignee ; and the grantor or lessor, or his heir may at any time bring an action on
such covenant.

( 2 Greenleaf's Cruise R. P. 756.)

It is

not so with a personal covenant ; the real covenant may bind
an unnamed assignee, but the personal covenant does not run
with the land, and is binding only upon the covenantor and his
personal representatives,

and in favor of the covenantee.

American and English Rule.

The covenants for title are five in number, viz : covenant for quiet enjoyment ; against incumbrances ; that the
grantor will warrant and defend the title ; the covenant for
seisin, and that the grantor has a good right to convey.

The

covenant for further assurance is still used in England, but
it is practically unknown to the American conveyancer.

In

England all of these covenants are held to run with the land.
(Rawl. Coy., 4 ed. 324.)

The greater part of the United

States, however, do not follow this rule.

In a general way

it may be said, that the covenants of warranty and of quiet
enjoyment are real, run with the land and are binding upon
subsequent assignees ; the covenants of seisin, of right to
convey, and against incumbrances, are personal, do not run
with the land and are not binding upon subsequent assignees.
(III Wash. R. P. 448 ; 4 Kent's Com. 471.)

The exceptions

to this rule will be given under the separate discussion of
each covenant.

The Covenant o f Warranty.

The operation and effect of this covenant was known long
before the introduction of deeds as a mode of transferring
real property and authenticating the sale or transfer of lands.
It was an incident of tenure, created without express contract.
Under the feudal system, when the lord or grantor conveyed
land to his vassal it was a mutual benefit act ; the vassal to
render homage to his lord, and the lord to protect and defend
him in the occupancy of his fief.

reciprocal.

Warranty and homage were

Before the age of written instruments of convey-

ance, the mere granting of a fief bound the giver to warranty ; when written instruments of conveyance were first introduced, the word "dedi

implied warranty, and it was not neces-

sary to state therein the word 'warranty" to obtain the benefit of this covenant.

4b
To the statutes Ae

mis (1276) and qr

e

may

be directly traced the introduction of express warranties into deeds.

The statute q

etore. prohibited the subinju-

dation of fee simple estates and provided that they should be
holden of the lord or original donor only ; thus there was no
tenure between the lord and the grantee of his grantee ; and
by the terms of the statute dje biai,
contained 'dedi

et n

es,

which says, 'where is

to be holden of the chief lord

of the fee or of others, and not of feoffors or any of their
heirs, reserving no service, without homage or the aforesaid
clause, their heirs shall not be bounden to warranty, notwithstanding the feoffer during his own life, by force of his own
gift, shall be bound to warranty', the second grantee was unprotected by the covenant of warranty, which before had been
implied, the statute having abolished the tenure on which it

depended.

This made necessary the introduction of express

warranties to protect the interests of the subsequent grantees.
Rights of the class represented by the ancient warranty,
and now by the usual covenants for title, are pure matters
of contract, and from a very early date down to comparatively
modern times lawyers have been perplexed with the question
how an assignee could sue upon a contract to which he was not
a party.

But an heir could sue upon a warranty of his ances-

tor, because for that purpose he was,under the statute of descent, in the same place as his ancestor.

And the conception

was gradually extended in a qualified way to assigns when they
were mentioned in the deed.

It is hard to say just when this

breach was closed, as we remember that the burden of an ordinary warranty in fee did not fall upon a devisee, although it

might upon an heir as representing the person of his ancestor.
This covenant is the most important one in the United
States.

By the Laws of New York, 1890, Ch. 475, Sec. 1, 'A

covenant that the grantor 'will forever warrant the title' to
the said premises shall be construed as meaning that the grantor and his heirs, or successors, the premises granted, and
every part and parcel thereof, with the appurtenances, unto
the grantee, his heirs, successors and assigns, against the
grantor and his heirs or successors, and against all and every
person or persons whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the
same shall and will warrant and forever defend.'

It is set-

tled beyond a doubt that this covenant runs with the land.

(M.thel1 lv. Warner, 5 Conn. 497 ; Brady v. Sr
478 ; Blakwell v. Atkinson,
54 III. 487 ; Whitney v.

, 27 Ill.

14 Cal. 470 ; Wead v. LXkin.,

-zismor , 6 Cush.

124 ; KiZv. Ker

5 Ohio, 155 ; Suyamv. Jones, 10 Wend. 180 ; Th

Erras_'

eskoff v.

Lan =L Trust Co., 58 Barb. 36. )

This covenant is broken only by eviction.

(Miller v.

Watson, 5 Cow. 195 ; ent v. Welfh, 7 Johns. 258.)
ion is either actual or constructive.

Evict-

It is actual when a

grantee is dispossessed by process of law.

It is construc-

tive when he yields possession to a title which is actually
paramount.

As long as he remains in possession, there is

neither ; and in order to maintain an action for breach of a
covenant of warranty, one or the other must be shown.
v. Stackpole, 40 Hun, 473.

(MI.d

See limitation of this rule in

Justice Swayne's opinion, post. )

The evidence must clear-

ly establish one or the other.

(Gardner v. McCarthy,

330 ; VanderKarr v. Yder .rr,

11 Johns. 122 ; Emerson v.

Proprietors,

etc.,

1 Mass.

464.)

3 Hill,

It was at one time held

that to constitute an eviction, 'there must be a disturbance
of the premises by legal process.'

Such is not now the rule.

Possession, without a struggle to maintain it, may be surrendered to one having a paramount title, with the same rights
to resort to the grantor's covenants of warranty that would
have been brought about by an eviction under process of law.
(Greenvault v. Davis, 4 Hill, 643-645-646 ; Cowdry v. C
44 N. Y. 392.)

,

As where the grantor has no title to the

land embraced within the lines of the description, the grantee may recover for the deficiency in an action upon the covenant of warranty.
188.)

(Robinson v. Robinson, 19 Weekly Digest,

If the public have an easement only in land, as the

right to use it as a highway, and the grantor should convey
such land by deed, and should have contained in the deed a
covenant of warranty, the existence of the easement would not

10

amount to a breach of that covenant.

(III Wash. R. P., 4 ed.,

460 ; Whitbebk v. Cook, 15 Johns. 483 ; Jackson v. Hathaway,
15 Johns. 447.)

It must be deemed the settled doctrine in

this State that the fact that a part of land conveyed with a
covenant of warranty was at the time of the conveyance a highway, and used as such, is not a breach of this covenant.

This

is so, for the reason that the grantee must be presumed to
have known of the existence of a public easement and purchased
upon a consideration in reference to the situation in that respect.

(Hymes v. Esty, 116 N. Y. 501 ; Huyck v. Andrews.,

N. Y. 85.)

113

Pennsylvania is in harmony with this doctrine.

(Wilson v. Cochran, 46 Penn. St. 229.)

Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment.

In one of the early cases (Howell v. Richards, 11 East.
634), this covenant is described as "special and particular
in its terms as well as general.'

By the Laws of New York,

1890, Ch. 475, Sec. 1, 'A covenant that the grantee 'shall
quietly enjoy the said premises' shall be construed as meaning that such grantee, his heirs, successors and assigns,
shall and may, at all times thereafter, peaceably and quietly have, hold, use, occupy, possess and enjoy the said premises, and every part and parcel thereof, with the appurtenances,
without any let, suit, trouble, molestation, eviction or disturbance of the grantor, his heirs, successors or assigns, or
any person or persons lawfully claiming or to claim the same.'
The English and American cases are uniform in holding that
this covenant runs with the land.

(Campbell v. Lewis, 3 Barn.

& Ald. 392 ; Lo2a v. Moulder, 1 Ark. 313 ; S. C. 33 Am. Dec.
338 ; Biddoe v. WadsrtL, 21 Wend. 120 ; Limited by 65 N. Y.
587 ; Hunt v.

Aidon, 4 Hill, 354.)

There has been considerable controversy among the cases
as to the kind of eviction necessary to support an action for

a breach of this covenant.

In Platt on Covenants, it is

said : "To qualify a party to support an action on a covenant
for quiet enjoyment, some positive act of molestation or some
act amounting to a prohibition of enjoyment must be shown."
But the court, in Shattuck v. Lab (65 N. Y. 500),

says : 'It

is not to be understood that an ouster or expulsion must take
place in order to found a suit ; it is enough that the quiet
enjoyment of the covenantee be invaded or prevented.

As

where at the time of the execution of the deed the premises
are in the possession of a third person, holding under a para-

mount title, and the grantee in consequence is defeated in
legal proceedings to obtain possession, and is kept out of
possession, this is a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.

It is not necessary that the grantee should make him-

self a trespasser and be ousted, in order to support an action on this covenant.

(Shattuck v. Lab, supra ; Park v.

Bates, 12 Vt. 381 ; Duval v. C

, 2 Wheat. 621.)

As where

a person takes a deed with a covenant for the quiet enjoyment
of land, with a house thereon, and it turns out that a third
person has title to the house, which he removes, it would be
a breach of this covenant.
Mot v. FImr,

(Funk v. Creswell, 5 Iowa, 88 ;

1 N. Y. 564 ; Scriver v. Smith, 100 N. Y. 471)

In Noonan v. Sith, 2 Black, (U. S.), Mr. Justice Swayne
says : "In all cases where there is adverse possession by virture of a paramount title, such possession is regarded as e-

viction and involves a breach of the covenant of warranty or
of quiet enjoyment.'

This is the. rule given in Shattuck v.

Lamb (supra), which overrules many of the early New York decisions that hold actual eviction necessary.

Where premises

are conveyed with a covenant of quiet enjoyment, and there is
at the time of such conveyance an outstanding title to an easement, which materially impairs the value of the premises and
interferes with the use and possession of some portion thereof, the covenant of quiet enjoyment is broken, although there
is no technical physical ouster.

In this case a land owner

below the land which was conveyed, by virtue of a paramount
title in the nature of an easement, raised the height of a
dam upon his land, thereby flooding the land that was conveyed ; this was held an eviction.
In the case of Green v. Collin (86 N. Y. 246), there was

an artificial easement in question,- an incorporeal hereditament,- and it was held that because it did not belong to the
grantor it did not pass as appurtenant to the land granted,
was not conveyed by the deed, and hence was not within the
scope of the covenant for quiet enjoyment.

It has sometimes

been supposed that there was a conflict between the cases of
Green v. C

(supra) and Adams v. C

(87 N. Y. 422.).

The distinction between the two cases is clear ; in the one
case the grantee got all that was covered by his deed, and
there was no breach of the covenant of warranty or of quiet
enjoyment.

In the other case (Adams v. Conover) the grantee

did not get all that was covered by his deed, and there was a
breach of covenant.

(Scriver v. Smith, supra.)

The three cases just above cited are the leading New
York cases construing this covenant, and their authority is

unquestioned.

Covenant against Incumbrances.

This covenant is of great importance.

It gives to a

grantee protection from an incumbrance upon the land at the
time of its conveyance.

By the Laws of New York, 1890, Ch.

475, Sec. 1, it is provided as follows : "A covenant 'that the
said premises are free from incumbrances' shall be construed
as meaning that such premises are free, clear, discharged and
unincumbered of and from all former and other gifts, grants,
titles, charges, estates, judgments, taxes, assessments, liens

and incumbrances of any nature or kind whatsoever.'

It is

further provided, in the same section, that : "A covenant that
the grantor 'has not done or suffered anything whereby the
said premises have been incumbered in any way whatsoever'

shall be construed as meaning that the grantor has not made,
done,coimnitted, executed or suffered any act or acts, thing
or things whatsoever, whereby or by means whereof the above
mentioned and described premises, or any part or parcel thereof, now are, or at any time hereafter shall or may be impeached, charged or incumbered in any manner or way whatsoever.'
It would seem that this last covenant is in the nature
of a strict covenant against incumbrances, and still is of
the character of a covenant of further assurance.

From a

strict construction of the language used, it is evident that
it would run with the land.

The act is a recent one and has

never been construed by the courts.

With but few exceptions,

the strict covenant against incumbrances is held to be personal, and broken at once if at all.
Corn.

497 ; W)=

(Mithelv. W.iarner, 5

v. Ballad, 12 Mass. 304 ; Heath v. Whidden

24 Me. 383 ; I&Qoro v. Merrill, 17 N. H. 75 ; Lhotter v. T
6 Vt. 75.)
the land.

o,

But in Ohio this covenant is held to run with
(Foote v. Burnet, 10 Ohio, 333.)

sane has been held.

(Knadler v. S

And in Iowa the

, 36 Iowa, 232.)

The

court, in Foote v. Burnet (supra), says : 'If the first grantee contnues in possession of the land while his title remains
undisturbed, and he conveys to a subsequent grantee, in whose
time an outstanding incumbrance is enforced against the land,
justice requires that this subsequent grantee should have the
benefit of the covenant against incumbrances to indemnify himself."

The only case cited in support of this theory is

Backus v. McCoy, (3 Ohio, 211.).
The reasoning of the Ohio court is tenable and the opinion one of merit.

And if it were not for the precedent, it

might be contended for in this State with success, when we

19

remember that all the covenants in a deed are made to the
grantee and his assigns, and the only reason ever given why
the covenant against incumbrances does not run with the land,
or at least why it

does not pass to the assigns of the gran-

tee when he conveys, is that such a covenant is broken as soon
as made, and therefore the right to recover on it is only a
chose in action, which at comon law was not assignable.

A

covenants against incumbrances to B and his assigns ; a conveys and assigns to C all that he received from A_,

yet -Cgets

no right to recover on the covenant against incumbrances,
cause choses in action are not assignable.

be-

This reasoning

cannot apply in New York and in those States where choses in
action are assignable.

In applying this rule there, a patent

fallacy appears in the premises,-- the restriction against
assigning choses in action is removed, and there is no valid

reason why the rights under this covenant will not pass to a
subsequent grantee.
The rights under this covenant are the most often disputed where there is an unusual tax assessed on the land conveyed.

If the tax is assessed imediately after the convey-

ance it is not a breach of this covenant.
113 N. Y. E1i.)

(Banms v.

(Huyck v. A,

Even if the covenantor knew of its existence.

Delaney, 40 Fed. 97.)

But no tax is a lien until

the amount thereof is ascertained or determined ; this is the
best test.
.Ly, 113

(Lather

IT. Y. 644.)

v. Keoh, 109 N. Y. 583 ; H&rgey v. DownA late case (MkLaughl

N. Y. ; S. C. 26 N. E. 1104),

rule.

is

v. Miller, 125

an apparent exception to this

In that case the legislature authorized a street im-

provement, and directed the assessors to assess a certain portion of the amount each year 'equally upon the lands fronting

on the avenue."
quired.

No notice to the property owners was re-

In an action by the grantee against the grantor in

a deed of land abutting on the avenue, for breach of a covenant that the land was free from all charges and assessments,
it

appeared that the plaintiff had paid a sumn for such im-

provement, inserted in the assessment rolls prior to the execution of the deed, but it was not shown that the assessment
was made by the board of assessors, or that notice was given
the property owners before it was made.

And it was held that

the assessment was not a charge on the land ; and that payment of such assessments for previous years by the grantor did
not estop him, as against his grantee, to deny that the subsequent assessment was a charge on the land.
ciple on which to support an action is
ed of must be valid.'

The test prin-

: "the interest complain

Covenant of Seisin.

This covenant is one in which the grantee covenants that
he is seized of the very estate which he purports to convey.
In New York this covenant is construed by statute (Laws of
New York, 1890, Ch. 475, Sec. 1), as follows : 'A covenant
that the grantor 'is seized of the said premises (described)
in fee simple, and has good right to convey the same' shall
be construed as meaning that such grantor at the time of the
execution and delivery of the conveyance is lawfully seized
of a good, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance in
fee simple, of and in all and singular the premises thereby
conveyed, with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances
thereto belonging, and has good right, full power and lawful
authority to grant and convey the same by the said conveyance."
The general and better rule is that such a covenant is

broken at once if

at all.

not run with the land.

Therefore it is personal and does
(Bingh

v. Wla

1 N. Y. 508 ;

McQarthy v. Lkgtt, 3 Hill, 134 ; Hamilton v. Wilson, 4 Johns.
72 ; Bx~dv. burk, 27 Ill. 478 ; Stewart v. Drake, 9 N. J.
L. 139.)

But a few States hold it a covenant that runs

with the land, (Sfieldv. Iowa Homestead CQo., 32 Iowa, 317 ;
Backus v. McCoy, 3 Ohio, 211) and in Maine, by statute, it
runs with the land.
The covenant of seisin extends only to a title existing
in a third person and which might defeat the estate granted.
(Fitch v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 161 ; Horrivan v. Rice (Minr.) 38
N. W. 765.)

There is a conflict of authority as to the na-

ture of the seisin which would meet the requirements of this
covenant.

Some States hold the mere possession of the land

by the covenantor is sufficient, even though he is a disseisin-

24
or.

(Marston v. Hobbs, 2 Mass. 439 ; Backus v.

211 ; Wilsonv.
In D

inha,

., 3 Ohio,

51 Me. 566.)

v. Suderlnd (17 Ohio, 52), the court says :

"Whether the covenant of seisin was personal or real depended
upon the fact whether the grantor was in possession or not
at the time of the conveyance ; if the grantor was in actual
possession, it attached and ran with the land, and was not
broken until eviction by title paramount ; but if he was not
in actual possession, either in law or in fact, the covenant
was "in p raenti' and personal,

and no one could maintain an

action for its breach but the grantee.

But this doctrine is

not looked upon with favor, and the States generally adopt
the rule that a covenant for seisin is a covenant that the
grantor has a good and legal title, and that it
mediately if the covenantor has no title.

is broken im-

(itchell

v. Hazen,

4 Conn. 497 ; Hn]itn.v. Wilson, 4 Johns. 72 ; McOarthy v.
Le

t,

supra ; Bingh a

v. Weidernwx, I N. Y. 509 ; Carm v.

.Doupass, 10 Iowa, 586 ; Wilson v. Cochran, 46 Penn. St. 229.)

Covenant of Right to Convey.

This covenant is in the nature of a covenant for seisin.
It is broken, if at all, imnediately on the execution of the
deed ; it is personal, and does not run with the land.

(Brick

ford v. Pa€_, 2 Mass. 455 ; Fowler v. PoinZ, 2 Barb.)

The

covenant is of minor importance, but the general rules given
as applicable to the covenant of seisin will apply to this
covenant.

The case of

canlin v. Allison (12 Kans. 85),

is a good illustration of this covenant.

In that case, cer-

tain persons attempted to sell and convey a piece of land, and
covenanted that they had good and lawful authority to sell

the sane, when in fact they had authority to sell and convey
only four undivided fifths.

The covenant was broken as soon

as the deed was delivered.

Covenant for Further Assurance.

This covenant is rarely used in this State, the only reported case being that of Colby v. Osgood (29 Barb. 339.)
was there held to run with the land.
New York by statute.
Sec. 1.)

It is interpreted in

(See Laws of New York, 1890, Ch. 475,

I

